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(3) Protection of the sanctity of the jury room by a provision
prohibiting the disclosure of communications emanating
therefrom whether overheard or recorded.

x
THE SUPREME COURT, THE SmITH ACT, AND THE "CLEAR
AND PRESENT DANGER" TEST

Introduction
Recent developments in the law have emphasized a need for
reconciling the freedoms of the individual citizen with the recognized
right of a lawfully-constituted sovereign to protect itself from violent
overthrow. Among these freedoms, none deserves greater attention
at the present time than the freedom of speech protected by the first
amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
Like all rights, freedom of speech ". . . is not absolute at all
times and under all circumstances." 1 But to admit that this freedom
is not absolute is not severely to limit it. Rather, it is to recognize
that there will be times when . . . restriction ... is required in order
to protect the State from destruction or from serious injury, political,
economic or moral." 2
Occasions for limitation arose early in our history. Soon after
our nation had freed itself from England, threats to its life appeared.3
To meet them Congress passed the much-criticized Alien and Sedition
Acts.4 It was not until 1917 that the next major federal curtailment
of speech occurred. This time it was an act which sought to curb
interference with the war effort.5 Forty years later, in 1957, controI Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). For decisions
where abridgements of this freedom have been upheld, see, e.g., Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, supra (statute prohibited addressing others in offensive, derisive or annoying language in public places); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927) (statute prohibited organization of groups to advocate and teach
criminal syndicalism); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)
(statute
prohibited
advocacy of criminal anarchy).
2
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (concurring opinion).
3 One author has estimated that in 1798, when war with France appeared
inevitable, there were some 30,000 unfriendly Frenchmen organized into groups
within our borders. 1 HRPEr's ECYCLOPAEDiA or UNITED STATES HISTORY
101 (1905).
For background material on our relations with France during
that period, see BAssEr, THE FEDmALST SYS=EM 218-29 (Hart ed. 1906);
Carroll, Freedom of Speech and of the Press in the Federalist Period; The

Sedition Act, 18 MicH. L. Rav. 615 (1920).
4Act of July 6, 1798, c. 66, 1 STAT. 577; act of July 14, 1798, c. 74,
I STAT. 596.
5 Espionage Act of 1917, 40 STAT. 217, repealed, 62 STAT. 862 (1948).
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versy centers about a statute directed against communists and all
others who advocate overthrow of our government by force.6
In light of the recent United States Supreme Court decision in
Yates v. United States,7 the history of this type of legislation will
be examined to determine whether the present Court, without straying beyond its constitutional powers, has struck the balance between
the rights of the individual and the equally important right of the
sovereign to protect itself.
The Sedition Act of 1798
To assure many fundamental rights which were hampered under
British rule, the Founding Fathers hastened to proclaim them, once
the new government was firmly established. One of these rights,
that of free speech, was stated in the first amendment of the Bill of
Rights:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances. 8
Within a very few years, however, the legislators did impose
restrictions on freedom of speech in the Sedition Act of 1798.9 Some
of its provisions, especially those concerned with criticism of government officials, 10 were extremely oppressive."
Unfortunately, it is
difficult to determine, from a distance of 159 years, whether it was
remedial of existing evils, or merely an example of political opportunism. For, all ten prosecutions under this statute were instigated
by a Federalist administration against Republican defendants.' 2 After
a brief, stormy life, the Sedition Act expired by its own terms. on
March 3, 1801.
6

18 U.S.C. §2385 (1952).

7 354 U.S. 298 (1957).

8 U.S.

CONST. amend. I.

9 Act of July 14, 1798, c. 74, 1 STAT. 596.
10 Id. at 596. ". . . [I] f any person shall write, print, utter or publish .

any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against . . . either
house of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the United
States, with intent to defame the said government . .. or to bring them ...
into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them . . . the hatred of the
good people of the United States . . . then such person . . . shall be
punished . . . ." Ibid.
11 Furthermore, it did not fail to produce a violent reaction. It was
vehemently denounced in resolutions by several of the state legislatures. See
especially the Virginia Resolutions of Dec. 24, 1798 (drafted by Madison)
and the Kentucky Resolutions of 1799 (drafted by Jefferson). DOCUMENTS
OF AMERICAN HISTORY 178-84 (Commager ed. 1948).
12

See 1

DICrIONARY OF AMERicAN HISTORY

49 (Adams ed. 1942). For a

report of one of the cases, see Trial of Thomas Cooper, Whart. St. Tr. 659
(1800).
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A Necessary Distinction

Statutes restricting speech may be put into two categories. A
statute may be drafted which clearly, explicitly, and unambiguously
provides for achievement of the legislative purpose. Or there may be
a statute in which legislative purpose is expressed in general terms.
In the former case, the Congress finds that a particular means tends
toward a particular evil. It then sets forth a specific description ol
these means and proscribes them. In the latter, the Congress determines that certain ends are to be prevented; prohibits conduct aimed
towards these ends; and leaves it to the court to determine whether
specific acts come within the purview of the statute.
Under the Constitution, all of the legislative power is vested in
the Congress."' Once a law is passed, the court's function is to apply
the law in cases properly brought before it, and ".

.

. it is . . . well

settled that where the means adopted by Congress are not prohibited
and are calculated to effect the object entrusted to it ... [the] Court
may not inquire into the degree of their necessity; as this would be
to .

.

. tread upon legislative ground."

14

In short, the separation of

powers in our government dictates that the court do nothing to restrict, expand or otherwise change the application of a clear and unambiguous statute, provided that the statute is constitutional. 15
If, then, the statute is clear and unambiguous, yet the court still
sees fit to apply judicial discretion, the question should immediately
arise: has the court exceeded its constitutional limits?
However, while the court should not practice judicial legislation
where a statute is clear and unambiguous, those statutes still remain
whose terms have been deliberately left general and vague by the
legislature. These require the exercise of a certain amount of judicial discretion, i.e., a restricted amount of legislative power vested in
the courts, the separation of powers doctrine notwithstanding. 16

'1"'All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of

the United States ....

"

U.S.

CONsT.

art. I, § 1.

14 Evereard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 559 (1924).
'I See, e.g., United States v. Standard Brewery Inc., 251 U.S. 210 (1920);

Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Binns v. Lawrence, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) 7 (1851).
36 An example of a statute wherein a certain amount of legislative power
has been entrusted to the courts by Congress is the Sherman Act. 26 STAT.
209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952). It provides, inter alia, that "every
contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." Id. at 209, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Though
these provisions are general, and leave room for application of considerable
discretion by the courts, they have been held not to be an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1 (1911).
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The Espionage Act of 1917
American involvement in World War I was a controversial
issue.1 7 Once the government had made the decision to enter the
war, it became necessary to obtain the support of all citizens in the
war effort. Apparently feeling that some citizens retained obstructive
sympathies, the legislators passed the Espionage Act of 1917.18 Its
prohibitions were directed chiefly against (1) prying into, withholding, or giving to unauthorized persons classified information in regard
to the war effort; 19 (2) communicating plans to foreign governments; 20 or (3) interfering with national defense, or obstructing
enlistments or conscription into the armed forces.21 An additional
section made conspiracy to do any of the above-mentioned acts punishable.22 Most subsequent developments were to be concerned with
the third substantive category above. Since it is couched in general
terms, the intention of the legislature to vest some judicial discretion
in the courts is apparent.
The first, and probably the most important, case to arise under
this statute was that of Schenck v. United States.2 The defendant
Schenck was accused of conspiracy to print and distribute circulars
which urged young men to refuse to serve in the armed services during the war. Although there was no showing that he had been at all
successful in hampering the war effort, the Supreme Court upheld
his conviction. In reaching the decision, Justice Holmes, speaking
for a unanimous Court, laid down the "clear and present danger" test.
"Clear and Present Danger" Test
The test arrived at by the Court was worded as follows:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
24
prevent.

In thus declaring that the character of every act depends on the circumstance in which it was done, criminality in this particular area
becomes at least partly a question of surrounding circumstances. Acts
which are legal in one context can be crimes in another.
In subsequent cases involving subdivision (3) of the Espionage
Act, the Court tended largely to follow the "clear and present danger"
1' See BARNES, GExCsIs OF THE WoRI

WAR 590-653 (rev. ed. 1929).
1s40 STAT. 217, repealed, 62 STAT. 862 (1948).

'9 Id. at 217.

20 Id.at 218.
21

Id. at 219.

Ibid.
23249 U.S. 47 (1919).
22

24

Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
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test set forth in the Schenck case. Frohwerk v. United States 25 and
Debs v. United States 26 were both decided squarely on the authority
of the Schenck case. The decisions in Abrams v. United States 27 and

Schaefer v. United States 28 showed a temporary departure from the

application of the test in so far as the Court did not expressly consider it in its opinion. But the Court returned to an application of it
quickly in the case of Piercev'. United States. 29 Significantly enough,
though the conviction in the latter case was sustained after an application of the "clear and present danger" test, the originator of the
test, Justice Holmes, and Justice Brandeis dissented. They believed
that defendants' anti-war, socialist pamphlet was not dangerous
enough to warrant suppression."0 Already we see divergent conclusions reached in the application of this test.
Gitlow v. New York
A few years later, with the makeup of the Court greatly changed,31
a case 3 2 was brought before it in which the application of a New York
criminal anarchy statute 3 3 was in question. The statute was directed
against advocating, organizing groups to advocate, or publishing literature which advocates, overthrow of the government by force.
Defendant Gitlow was charged with having published and distributed
pamphlets advocating such overthrow. The statute by
its terms.made
34
speech in furtherance of such a goal criminal per se.
249 U.S. 204
U.S. 211
27250 U.S. 616
268 U.S. 652, 673
25

26249
28251

(1919).

(1919).
(1919). For support of this view, see Gitlow v. New York,
(1925) (dissenting opinion).

U.S. 466 (1920).

29252 U.S. 239 (1920).

See also Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680,
687 30(1944).
Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 253 (1920) (dissenting opinion).
3
' Justices Holmes, Brandeis, VanDevanter, and McReynolds were the only
ones32 remaining from the nine who had participated in the Schenck decision.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
33 N.Y. PEN. LAw § 161. "Any person who:
1. By word of mouth or writing advocates, advises or teaches the duty,
necessity or propriety of overthrowing or overturning organized government
by force or violence ...
or by any unlawful means; or
2. Prints, publishes, . . . or ... distributes . . . any book ...

or printed

matter . . . containing or advocating, advising or teaching the doctrine that
organized government should be overthrown by force, violence or any unlawful
means....
3.

4. Organizes or helps to organize or becomes a member of or voluntarily
assembles with any society, group or assembly of persons formed to teach or
advocate such doctrine. [sic]
Is guilty of a felony... "' Ibid.
34 See note 33 supra.
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The majority, in affirming Gitlow's conviction, did not apply the
"clear and present danger" test, although Justice Holmes did so in
his dissent. 35 Rather, it expressly stated that such a test is not applicable to statutes like the criminal anarchy statute, wherein utterances of a certain kind are expressly prohibited. The Court said that
such tests are to be used only where the legislature has expressed its
will generally, as in the Espionage Act, in which case
. . it must necessarily be found, as an original question, without any previous
determination by the legislative body, whether the specific language used involved such likelihood of bringing about the substantive evil as to deprive it
of the constitutional protection.8 6
*

The statute applied in the Gitlow case37 was the model for the
Smith Act.38 Thus, the above statement of the Supreme Court is
entitled to careful consideration in any case where the Smith Act is
being applied.
The "Smnith Act Cases"
The Smith Act, in its original form, was passed in 1940.39

In

its present form, it provides as follows:
Whoever knowingly or wilfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the
duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the
government of the United States .

.

. by force or violence .

.

. ; or

Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group,
or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or
destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a
member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons,
knowing the purposes thereofShall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or
any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his
40
conviction.

The indictment and trial of Eugene Dennis and his associates
brought the questions of the constitutionality and the application of
the Smith Act squarely before the Supreme Court. 41 The defendants
were charged with teaching and advocating the doctrines of Marxism33 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925)

36 Id. at 671.
37 See note 31 supra.
38 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 309 (1957).
39 54 STAT. 670, 18 U.S.C. §§ 9-13 (1940).
40 18 U.S.C. §2385 (1952).
41 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

(dissenting opinion).
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Leninism, including the necessity of violently overthrowing existing
governments. In deciding the case in the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, Judge Learned Hand rephrased the test of Justice
Holmes: "In each case they [the courts] must ask whether the gravity
of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion
of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 42 Finding, in
effect, that there was a "clear and present danger," the court affirmed
the conviction. Judge Chase concurred in the result reached in this
case but disagreed with Judge Hand as to the need for application of
the test. 43 He preferred directly to follow the
Gitlow case and the
44
finding of Congress that the danger did exist.
In the Supreme Court, although Chief Justice Vinson did refer
to the distinction between general and specific restrictions of speech, 45
the conviction was affirmed on a finding that a "clear and present
danger" did exist.
Subsequent decisions followed the Dennis case closely in seeking
the existence of a "clear and present danger." 46 In United States v.
Lightfoot,47 the defendant was a member of the higher echelon of the
American Communist Party, and a teacher of its doctrines. In response to a question as to how he planned to attain his ends, a witness
quoted him as saying: "If we have to shed blood, we will." 48 In
affirming his conviction, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit advanced the proposition that freedom of speech protects advocacy and teaching of only those changes which could be
"... accomplished by processes which the Constitution provides." 49
The conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court.50
Yates v. United States
Yates and her thirteen co-defendants were indicted under the
Smith Act and charged, inter alia, with conspiracy to (1) organize,
as the American Communist Party, a group seeking violent overthrow, and (2) advocate and teach the doctrine of the necessity of
4

2 United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S.
494 43(1951).
Id.at 234 (concurring opinion).

44 Id. at 236-37 (concurring opinion).
45 Dennis v. United States, supra note 41, at 506.
46 See, e.g., Wellman v. United States, 227 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1955), rev'd

per curiam, 354 U.S. 931 (1957); United States v. Silverman, 129 F. Supp.
496 (D. Conn. 1955).
47 228 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1956), rev'd per curiam, 26 U.S.L. Week 3115
(U.S. Oct. 14, 1957).
48 United States v. Lightfoot, 228 F.2d 861, 868 (7th Cir. 1956), re'd per
curiam, 26 U.S.L. Week 3115 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1957).
49 Ibid.
50 Lightfoot v. United States, 26 U.S.L. Week 3115 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1957).
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violent overthrow of our government. 51 They were convicted in a
United States District Court in California 52 and the conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit. 53 Qn certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded Yates and eight
others to the district court.5 4 The rest were acquitted.
The Court disposed of the first charge mentioned above by construing "organize" to mean "found" or "initiate," determining that
the present Communist Party in the United States came into being
in 1945, and ruling that the three-year statute of limitations precluded
a conviction on that charge. 55
The second major charge was that the defendants taught or advocated the necessity of violent overthrow. Here the Court, while
admitting that the Smith Act was modelled after the New York criminal anarchy statute involved in the Gitlow case,5 6 did not employ the
rationale of the Gitlow case in arriving at its decision. The Court
decided that the trial court's instructions to the jury had been erroneous in that they excluded the issue of "incitement to action." In so
doing, they injected a new condition into this type of statute,5 T even
though the statutory wording-"advocates or teaches"-clearly shows
the legislature's intent to prohibit all expressions of the duty or necessity of violent overthrow, even when unaccompanied by a present
urging to action.
Justice Clark, in his dissent,58 relies heavily on the conclusion
reached in the Dennis case. In that case, however, there was a finding
that a "clear and present danger" did exist. 9 But in the instant case,
the majority requires the finding of an incitement to action as a condition to finding the existence of a danger. Since no such incitement
was sought to be found in the district court, there is an element of
consistency between the Dennis
case and the Yates case which might
60
not be readily appreciated.
51 United States v. Yates, 107 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Cal. 1952), aff'd, 225 F.2d
14652(9th Cir. 1955), rev'd, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
United States v. Yates, 107 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
53 Yates v. United States, 225 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1955).
54 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
55 Id. at 310-12.
56 Id. at 309.
57 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), where the Court said:
"It was not necessary, within the meaning of the statute, that the defendant
should have advocated 'some definite or immediate act or acts' of force, violence or unlawfulness. .

.

. Nor was it necessary that the language should

have been 'reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite certain persons' to
acts of force, violence or unlawfulness." Id. at 671-72.
58 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 344 (1957)

(dissenting opinion).

59
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
65
In the Yates trial the government submitted a request to charge on incitement to action which was identical to that given in the Dennis trial. The
court refused so to qharge. See Yates v. United States, suqpra note 58, at
316-17.
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Conclusion

Kept within its own area, the "clear and present danger" test
can be very valuable. If a rule of thumb is desired, Judge Hand's
test, "....

whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improb-

ability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
the danger," 61 should serve well. However, tests such as these can
not be constitutionally applied by the courts when the legislature has
given its mandate in specific terms. 62 Thus, where the legislature
specifically declares, as did the New York State legislature in its criminal anarchy statute,63 and as the Congress did in the Smith Act,"
that words advocating or teaching a specified course of action, to wit,
overthrow of the government by force or violence, are criminal, the
judiciary's function is limited. 65 Provided that the statute is not
declared unconstitutional, the courts should only determine whether
the defendant's acts were those described in the statute. An attempt
to do more is violative of the doctrine of the 'separation of powers.
The wisdom of a particular piece of legislation is not the concern
of courts. Such determinations are made by, and responsibility rests
with, the legislators. The result reached in the instant case is relatively unimportant; Yates' possible guilt or innocence should not be
our great concern. What is important is that it indicates another
departure from what appears to be the clear intention of the legislature, a departure which would not have occurred had the Court
followed the reasoning of its predecessors in the decision of Gitlow v.
New York.

61
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S.
49462(1951).
See, e.g., United States v. Standard Brewery Inc., 251 U.S. 210 (1920);
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Thornley v. United States,
113 U.S. 310 (1884); Lewis v. United States, 92 U.S. 618 (1875); Binns v.
Lawrence, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 7 (1851).
63 N.Y. PEx. LAW § 161.
64 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952).
65"... [W]hen the language is plain and explicit our [the Court's] only
province is to give effect to the act as plainly expressed in the terms." American
Express Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 522, 535 (1909).

